Governor denounces decision by federal regulators on price limit

Paul Feist, Chronicle Staff Writer Friday, July 12, 2002 002 San Francisco Chronicle. URL: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2002/07/12/BA157391.DTL Responding to California's latest power struggles, federal regulators on Thursday set a firm price limit of $92 a megawatt hour for electricity, saying lower limits that kicked in during this week's heat wave could lead to rolling blackouts. Although some energy officials said the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's move would add stability to California's market, consumer activists and Gov. Gray Davis denounced the order. "Once again, FERC is protecting generators, not consumers,' said Davis in a reprise of the harsh rhetoric he directed at federal regulators before limits were imposed last June. The order scraps a complicated formula that allowed price ceilings on electricity to dip to about $55 a megawatt hour after power emergencies were called this week. Although generators are required to sell into the market during emergencies, some officials believe that suppliers might be reluctant to do so with lower price limits. "We act now because we cannot expose customers in California and other Western states to the risks of a low price cap," the energy regulators' order said. "A low energy price cap . . . could cause severe supply disruptions." The higher ceiling of $92 a megawatt hour will apply to spot market purchases in California until all price limits expire in 12 weeks. Regulatory commission officials said that higher price ceiling has worked well to stabilize the state's power market over the past year, noting that energy prices rarely approached that limit. "We think the stability this this provides is a good thing," said Gregg Fishman, a spokesman for the California Independent System Operator, which manages most of the state's power grid. Davis, however, said that the state, which has buying power on behalf of the state's financially troubled utilities, has been able to find enough power for $20 to $30 a megawatt hour. "If FERC believes nearly $92 per megawatt hour is a just and reasonable rate, it is way out of line," Davis said. The regulatory commission order does not apply to long-term power contracts signed by the state last year in an attempt to tame the volatile spot market, which sent the price of power soaring to $300 a megawatt hour or more. A megawatt is enough to power about 750 homes. The amount of electricity purchased on the spot market is about 5 percent of daily use now as opposed to about 35 percent during the height of the energy crisis. Fishman said there is no indication that suppliers withheld power or drove up prices during the heat wave. "Certainly, the market has behaved rather well lately and we don't need pice caps to screw things up," said Gary Ackerman, executive director of the Western Power Trading Forum. Michael Shames, executive director of the Utility Consumers Action Network, said the regulatory commission had no evidence that suppliers weren't selling into the market. "This is designed to get more money to the generators, and it comes from ratepayers," Shames said. U.S. Sen. Dianne Feinstein said she thought the regulatory commission order was prudent. "There is some concern that there may not be sufficient power at peak demand due to the record heat wave, but FERC officials feel this cap is a fair price that can guarantee continued power for California," Feinstein said. Grid operators in California called a Stage 2 emergency Wednesday as blistering heat moved across the West. The emergency is one step away from rolling blackouts. No power emergencies were declared Thursday as lower temperatures took hold.

2002年07月13日 10時38分55秒

THE ENRON COLLAPSE

New York Times Sunday, January 13, 2002 002 San Francisco Chronicle URL: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2002/01/13/MN93328.DTL Not long ago, Enron Corp.'s name was part of the lexicon of corporate and political power. The company's contacts and influence in the White House and Congress bred envy among competitors. Enron was a driving force behind a radical shift in the U.S. energy policy, and its fortune seemed guaranteed for years. But in a matter of weeks, Enron has been transformed into shorthand for a corporate scandal, one that has touched politicians and regulators in Washington, accountants and executives on Wall Street, and employees and other shareholders who lost tens of billions of dollars as the company tumbled into bankruptcy protection. The ultimate cause of Enron's brutal collapse, competitors and lawyers say, was a culture of greed and arrogance that bred excessive secrecy. As some of the company's secrets began to be revealed last fall -- stunning Wall Street with tales of mysterious partnerships that had been used to pretty up Enron's books -- the stage was set for disaster. Whispers in the energy markets and the company's growing financial weakness set off a swift loss of confidence among traders and bankers. Sources of financing evaporated, a merger deal collapsed and, finally, Enron hobbled into Bankruptcy Court. As creditors quarrel over its remains, investigators in Congress, the Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission are demanding answers. Enron executives had hoped to make the company a new model for U.S. industry. And indeed, the tale of the company's rapid rise and astonishing collapse will be studied for years -- but as an object lesson in the dangers of relying on financial juggling for big profits and the hazards of a business that corporate executives and directors, Wall Street analysts and government regulators barely understood. A PROFITABLE NEW STRATEGY It all started in the heady takeover days of the 1980s. Enron decided to transform itself. No longer would it simply be an asset- heavy company in the business of moving and selling gas; instead, it would become part of the commodities-trading world, buying and selling electricity and natural gas as if they were pork belly futures. To accomplish the transformation, Enron Chief Executive Kenneth Lay had as his protege Jeffrey Skilling, a consultant with McKinsey & Co. Skilling brought a new dynamic to the once-staid business. Skilling was able to understand how the markets could be used to liberate Enron from its reliance on the old world of hard assets. Instead, he proposed a system whereby Enron would essentially become the investment banker of natural gas. Business boomed, and in 1990 Skilling left McKinsey to run Enron Finance Corp., a division that the growing company had created just for him. By 1995, Enron had become the biggest participant in the natural gas business, controlling one-fifth of the North American market. As the money poured in, the apparent success of the vision set forth by Skilling brought him the brass ring: In 1997, he was named the president and chief operating officer of Enron. Skilling, dizzy with the profits that accrued as Enron moved into one new trading market after another, wanted to rid the company of all its hard assets. But other executives pressed forward with plans to give Enron a global reach. It built power plants around the globe. It decided to become a force in the global water business. On the trading side, it splashed its way into the trendy market for high-speed data and Internet capacity. These efforts represented a collective investment of more than $10 billion, but they were producing next to nothing in returns. But few of Enron's problems were evident to the company's supporters on Wall Street. Through Enron's chief financial officer, Andrew Fastow, the company set up a series of limited partnerships, organized in such a way that, by company executives' reckoning, they could be treated as separate entities. It was like a magic financial elixir that provided the answers to many of Enron's growing problems: If there were any assets or debts on the books that the company did not want, they could simply be shed to the partnerships. AGGRESSIVE, INFLUENTIAL TRADERS Enron wasn't merely the largest player in the nation's deregulated energy markets. It helped create them. Enron moved aggressively, seeking to gain the biggest shares of trading in these new and fast-growing markets -- lining up supply contracts to buy power and gas while cutting deals to sell the energy to customers, often over the long term. Analysts estimate that at its peak Enron accounted for about one-quarter of the nation's energy trading -- not producing much energy itself, but serving mostly as a middleman. More significantly, Enron dominated the trading of financial contracts, or derivatives, based on the value of gas and electricity traded at physical "hubs" around the nation. At some hubs, rival energy traders say, Enron accounted for a much higher percentage of trading of some products, giving it enormous influence in the marketplace. The company's critics observe that while energy prices were rising, Enron was riding high, but that it began to falter this summer -- when prices for electricity and gas collapsed. In other words, they say, it may not be a coincidence that Enron's house of cards tumbled down at the same time energy costs sharply retreated, as profits from high prices were no longer able to offset severe problems at the company. COMPANY CONCEALED DEBTS Flying high after being unshackled from regulation, Enron crashed quickly last fall following a series of revelations about its bookkeeping practices -- in particular, concealing huge chunks of debt by transferring them into still- murky partnerships. By reducing the debt on its books, the company looked healthier and its profits looked more robust, even as the results of its trading operations and energy sales were flagging. But within a matter of weeks, Enron found itself in bankruptcy, under investigation, and the target of lawsuits from burned investors and former trading partners. Many questions remain unanswered, but one thing is certain: As a result of Enron's successful lobbying efforts, Washington was largely out of the business of regulating those products the company sold. If the regulators in Washington were asleep, it was because the company had made their beds and turned out the lights. The company's financial successes were in no small part the byproduct of its political and regulatory campaigns to deregulate the marketplace. But there were still traditional corporate mechanisms and institutions in place that should have raised alarms. "The fact that things declined so fast strongly suggests a breakdown of basic corporate governance," said David Ruder, a former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission who teaches at Northwestern University School of Law. For all the blame now being assigned, experts say the biggest failure -- at least based on what has become public so far -- appears to rest with the company's auditors, Arthur Andersen. With the disclosure last week that Andersen employees had destroyed large numbers of documents related to the firm's audits of Enron, investigators will be aiming many of their toughest questions at the accountants. BIG CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS Beginning in the early 1990s, Enron pursued its campaigns for energy deregulation by hiring dozens of Washington's most influential lobbyists and showering lawmakers on Capitol Hill with large campaign contributions. By the time President Bush was inaugurated in January 2001, Enron and a number of its executives, including Lay, had contributed more money to Bush over his political career than anyone else, an amount exceeding $550,000. Enron then wrote a check for $100,000 for Bush's inaugural committee, and Lay added another $100,000. Last winter, the perennial questions about access given to large campaign contributors were asked about Enron. Lay had weighed in on nominees to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, supplying Bush's chief personnel adviser with a list of preferred candidates. After Sept. 11, there was almost no discussion about Enron's connections to the White House. Even in the weeks before the company filed for bankruptcy last month, Democrats said little about the company's ties to the Bush administration. But four separate congressional inquiries were begun to investigate Enron's collapse after it was revealed that many employees lost their life savings when its stock collapsed, but company executives were able to cash out $1 billion worth of stock. The Enron issue finally hit the White House last week after the administration acknowledged that Enron executives had six meetings last year with administration officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney. The Justice Department announced that it was opening a criminal investigation of the energy company's collapse, including whether it had defrauded investors by deliberately concealing information about its finances. Attorney General John Ashcroft and his chief of staff both recused themselves from the inquiry because Lay and Enron had contributed more than $50,000 to Ashcroft's 2000 senatorial campaign. More disclosures followed. On Thursday, the White House disclosed that Lay had called two of Bush's Cabinet officers -- Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill and Commerce Secretary Donald Evans -- before the company filed for bankruptcy. Evans said Lay had sought government help with its dire financial condition. And on Friday, the administration said that Peter Fisher, an undersecretary of the Treasury, was contacted repeatedly last fall by Enron's president, Greg Whalley, for help arranging bank loans. "I'm very worried that we have not gotten to the end of the onion skin here, there's more to peel back," a longtime Republican strategist said. This article was reported by New York Times writers Stephen Labaton, Ross E. Milloy, Richard A. Oppel Jr., Don Van Natta Jr. and Kurt Eichenwald.

2002年01月14日 00時44分51秒

THE ENERGY CRUNCH, A YEAR LATER

State's deregulation folly is no laughing matter Consumers face inflated bills for years for failed electricity plan Carolyn Said, Chronicle Staff Writer Monday, December 24, 2001 001 San Francisco Chronicle URL: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2001/12/24/MN71492.DTL It was supposed to save money. Now that California has burned billions of dollars to keep the lights on over the past 18 months, it seems absurd. The entire impetus for the state's grand experiment with electricity deregulation was to cut costs -- for everyone from manufacturers to consumers to utilities to power generators. Instead, California could be paying the tab for years. The state must come up with billions to cover its new role as electricity purchaser. And even though energy prices now have fallen, consumers and businesses still pay the higher rates imposed during the dark days of last spring. It's a far cry from the rosy scenario of savings for everyone envisioned when deregulation got its start. As predictable as characters in a commedia dell'arte, representatives of assorted interest groups trooped to Sacramento in the mid-1990s, enacting set pieces about their agendas -- all with the common interest of structuring deregulation to their benefit. -- Manufacturers, who had just weathered a devastating recession in the early '90s, wanted flexibility to negotiate better power rates from providers other than the state's investor-owned utilities. "Before deregulation, California had 50 percent higher (electricity) rates than its neighboring states," said Gino DiCaro, spokesman for the California Manufacturers and Technology Association. "That's why large industrial users pushed for it so hard." -- Utilities -- San Diego Gas and Electric, Pacific Gas and Electric and Southern California Edison -- wanted a way to recoup the billions of dollars in "stranded costs" they had sunk into nuclear power plants and contracts for alternative energy. -- Consumer advocates wanted to shield electricity users from future hikes. -- Power generators wanted every home, office and factory to be able to buy electricity directly from a supplier -- i.e., themselves. -- Power regulators and lawmakers wanted to loosen the utilities' monopoly on both power production and supply. CRAFTING LEGISLATION The Legislature was eager to accommodate everyone. Once the Public Utilities Commission voted in 1995 to institute deregulation, the task of crafting a plan was entrusted to state Sen. Steve Peace (D-El Cajon). Peace, such a policy wonk that he makes Al Gore look like Dan Quayle, plunged enthusiastically into the minutiae; his marathon late-night sessions to thrash out arcane details became known as the "Steve Peace Death March." The complex bill passed with no dissenting votes, although later lawmakers admitted that many hadn't understood it. Gov. Pete Wilson signed it on Sept. 23, 1996. The plan had something for everyone. Manufacturers -- the steel makers, mining concerns and cement makers that spend a quarter of their overhead on electricity costs -- could line up their own sources of energy. Utilities were instructed to sell off their power plants so they would get payback for their initial investments, and also would no longer have a monopoly over both power production and supply. Consumers got a 10 percent rate cut and a promise of no rate hikes until 2002 or until utilities paid off their capital investments in power plants, whichever came first. The rate freeze also mollified the utilities, who wanted to make sure that rates would not go down. FLAWED FROM THE GET-GO The fundamental flaws stemmed from the fact that deregulation tried to have the best of both worlds: rate controls that applied only to wholesale prices, not retail prices; power plant ownership that rested in the hands of out-of- state generators, not local utilities; a dependence on the volatile spot market for purchases; and no flexibility for those buying electricity to just say no when the wholesale price got too high. The breakdown on specific defects in the plan: -- Rate freeze. Even though the consumer rate freeze was what made deregulation palatable to consumers -- and thus legislators, who wanted credit for saving people money -- it didn't encourage conservation among consumers or competition among electricity suppliers. -- No cap on wholesale rates. The rate freeze affected only half the equation -- the amount consumers paid for electricity. There was no concurrent cap on what the utilities paid for electricity. That meant things could -- and did -- get drastically out of control. In fact, to encourage power generation, deregulation guaranteed the highest price for wholesale electricity. The last bidders in the market, who paid the most, set the price for everyone. -- No long-term contracts. The plan forced most electricity purchasing to occur a day ahead or on the volatile spot market. The result was no ability to lock in cheap rates with longer-term contracts. -- No flexibility to say no. The ISO managers were bred in the bone to keep the lights on at all cost. That meant that when supplies were tight, they would pay any price to ensure a consistent flow of juice. Power companies figured this out: Charging what the market could bear meant the sky was the limit. -- No true competition. Competition among electricity generators was supposed to be one of the hallmarks of the new market. Theoretically, consumers would shop for the best electricity plan just as they do for the best long-distance phone plan, and the electricity companies would vie to offer the best rates. But because of the rate freeze, consumers didn't have any reason to switch suppliers. By early 2000, only 1 percent of consumers had switched. -- Tight supply. A new power plant costs a staggering half a billion dollars for a 500-megawatt facility (large enough to light 500,000 homes). During the years the state thrashed out deregulation, companies were reluctant to invest in building plants in California, because they didn't know if the new market structure would let them recoup their investments. Consequently, throughout the 1990s, the state built only a handful of small plants totaling 1,075 megawatts. But by the mid-90s, California was back to being a gold-rush state, with the population on the upswing and the tech economy booming. Generating capacity fell behind demand. CLUES SOMETHING WAS WRONG One of the first steps in implementing deregulation was for the utilities to sell off their power plants. That would open the market to a bevy of competitors, who would then vie to offer the lowest prices -- or so the theory went. Out-of-state power companies, not ordinarily known for their spendthrift ways, bid big bucks to take over decades-old power plants -- a motley collection of black-smoke belching, decades-old electron factories. Six power firms spent $3.5 billion, many times the book value of the 17,000 megawatts of facilities. In retrospect, experts said, those big-bucks purchases showed that the companies must have realized that deregulation was going to be a happy hunting ground for them. "Most industry observers thought those older-generation assets would go for bargain-basement prices," said state Sen. Joe Dunn (D-Santa Ana), who heads the Senate Select Committee to Investigate Price Manipulation in the Wholesale Energy Market. When instead they sold for huge prices, it should have raised some suspicions: "What did they know that the rest of us didn't?" The Bay Area got a taste of blackouts during a bout of hot weather in June 2000. The sudden spike in demand not only shorted out the grid, it brought about an epiphany for power generators, according to Michael Shames, head of Utility Consumers Action Network in San Diego. "The generators figured out how to game the market when San Francisco had that blackout from the freak heat wave," he said. "When the prices went as high as they did, they realized, 'You know what? If there's a shortage, there's no limit on what we can ask.' " Ongoing hot weather down south kicked off another ominous chain of events. In San Diego, which essentially was the canary in the coal mine, the little clause that said the rate freeze could end once utilities paid off their debts turned out to have teeth. The windfall from selling off its power plants gave SDG&E enough money to pay off its $2 billion in stranded costs. That meant the rate freeze was no longer in effect; instead, customers' prices would be determined by the market. And the market went haywire. Power generators "started holding back from the day-ahead market and pushing transactions closer and closer to real time," said Arthur O'Donnell, editor and associate publisher of California Energy Markets, a newsletter in San Francisco. "That turned out to be a recipe for disaster. Essentially, (generators) could double or triple what they might get by holding back." Rates soared by a factor of up to 20 times for the 3 million SDG&E customers. The Legislature had to step in in late August to impose price caps. PG&E and Edison were experiencing similar difficulties with ballooning power rates. As they were still barred from passing their escalating costs to customers, they began to accumulate billions of dollars in debts. MOTHER NATURE STEPS IN Meanwhile, weather conditions were building to create a "perfect storm" scenario that would come into play for the entire state later in the year: -- For several years, winters had been mild, so consumers used less heat, so natural gas providers slowed exploration, while utilities allowed stockpiles to be depleted. -- The Pacific Northwest was in the third year of a drought in 2000; that meant the source for a significant portion of California's electricity would have an empty cupboard when crunch time hit. -- The summer of 2000 was unusually hot, triggering increased use of electricity. -- The winter of 2000-01 was unusually cold and everyone cranked up the heat. Natural gas was in short supply, so its price soared overnight. Most power plants in California also use natural gas to produce electricity, so suddenly their basic input was astronomically expensive -- which meant so was their output. HITTING THE FAN By last winter, human myopia and greed, coupled with nature's relentlessness, had set the stage for an electricity fiasco. And that's exactly what we got. In January, the first rolling blackouts directly attributable to deregulation, not the weather, hit California. Their timing was mysterious, coming during the winter when electricity demand is low because no one's using power-guzzling air conditioners. The proximate cause was that a number of power plants were unexpectedly off-line, a situation that caused power prices to shoot up. Power generators "would reduce power and see what happens to the price, just like Homer Simpson in the Barcalounger saying, 'The chair goes up; the chair goes down,' " O'Donnell said. Still, he added, "There was nothing illegal or even especially bad about such activities -- merely profit maximization behavior by sellers taking advantage of flaws in the system to make money." This pattern repeated itself for months. It led to speculation that generators were "gaming" the market, purposefully taking plants out of service to drive up prices. But substantiating those charges would require a smoking gun -- some tangible proof that electricity firms explicitly colluded to set prices -- something that has eluded investigators. "If you go to a plant, and they tell you it's down, they'll say they have good reasons," said Severin Borenstein, director of the University of California Energy Institute. "What are you going to say, 'We don't think that cog needs to be replaced'?" As the situation continued to spiral out of control, the state had to step in to take over the purchase of electricity from the foundering utilities, and slapped Californians with a rate hike to help pay the piper. Edison and PG&E essentially ran out of money -- although their parent companies continued to exhibit healthy balance books. PG&E filed for bankruptcy reorganization in April, with Edison cutting a separate, $3.3 billion rescue deal with California. LONG-TERM CONTRACTS Grasping for a lasting solution, Gov. Gray Davis negotiated long-term power contracts so blackouts would no longer loom as a threat, paying $43 billion for power over the next 20 years. But his timing was equivalent to buying, say, Amazon.com stock just before the dot-com swoon on the Nasdaq. "He basically bought this huge insurance policy through long-term contracts (but) paid way too much," said Peter Navarro, an economics professor at the University of California at Irvine Business School. By signing the contracts at the height of the market, Davis locked the state into billions of dollars more than it should have to pay, observers said. Davis retorted that the contracts were what brought down power prices. Now, Davis is scrambling to renegotiate those deals. Philip Verleger, a Newport Beach economist, sees the genesis for the whole debacle in the blueprints for deregulation so tortuously drafted over half a decade ago. "It's like the old joke about an economist: someone who knows 250 ways to make love and has never had a date," he said. "Everybody who was involved with the designing of this electricity system knew lots of ways to set up a market for electricity, but they had never traded. "There's a wonderful saying by Ben Franklin: There's no uglier sight in life than a beautiful theory mugged by an angry gang of facts. California got squeezed about a million times, and its electricity market didn't figure it out." -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ABOUT THIS SERIES Yesterday: What ever happened to the energy crisis? Today: The march of folly that led to the energy problem Tomorrow: Deregulation is not dead...yet -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POWER DEREGULATION CHRONOLOGY 1994 April: California Public Utilities Commission indicates it favors deregulation. . 1995 October: Framework of deregulation laid out in memorandums between large users, energy providers and utilities. . 1996 January: Bills introduced in Legislature to codify deregulation plan. August: The "Steve Peace Death March" hashes out fine points of law. It passes both houses unanimously. Sept. 23: Gov. Pete Wilson signs the deregulation bill. . 1998 March 31: After a four-month delay, deregulation begins. . 2000 May: Wholesale electricity prices begin an unprecedented rise. June: San Diego rate cap is lifted. Shortages drive prices up 300 percent in some cases. September: The utilities begin to warn of billions in mounting debt and seek an end to the rate cap that has prevented them from passing costs on to customers. November, December: More shortages put energy system in state of perpetual crisis. Dec. 16: Davis calls a special session and reserves $1 billion in his 2001- 02 budget to deal with the power crisis. . 2001 Jan. 4: PUC announces three-month rate increase of 10 percent for PG&E and Edison customers. Jan. 17: Rolling blackouts ordered in California for the first time. Davis declares a state of emergency. Jan. 19: Davis signs $400 million bill to buy electricity and resell it to utilities. Feb. 1: State lawmakers empower California to spend up to $10 billion to buy thousands of megawatts of power and sell it to consumers. March 5: Davis announces he's signed long-term contracts for enough electricity to light 9 million homes over the next decade, at an average cost of $69 per megawatt hour. Details are kept secret. April 5: Pacific Gas and Electric Co. files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization. May 15: State regulators adopt most sweeping electricity rate increase in California history: up to 40% for residential and 50% for industrial customers. June 18: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission unanimously imposes a sweeping price ceiling on wholesale price of electricity around the clock throughout the 11 states of the West. July 23: Officials say California has lost $14 million in past three weeks selling surplus electricity back to power generators as mild temperatures and energy conservation reduce demand statewide. Oct. 2: State regulators approve a bail-out plan for Southern California Edison that lets it keep higher rates in place through 2003. Oct. 18: Davis administration says it hopes to renegotiate some of the $43 billion in power contracts to get a better rate than $69 a megawatt hour, now that average prices are around $30 a megawatt hour.

2001年12月25日 07時41分49秒

THE ENERGY CRUNCH A Year Later

A Year Later Paying the price of power After the state spends billions, PG&E faces bankruptcy and rates soar, the cost of keeping the lights on hits home Sunday, December 23, 2001 001 San Francisco Chronicle URL: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2001/12/23/MN32851.DTL When the energy market's version of the "perfect storm" came ashore last January, it lashed California with full fury. Power went out. Once-mighty utilities appeared doomed. Heating costs soared. Elected officials -- some accused of inviting the disaster with a flawed deregulation scheme -- braced for the economic and political fallout. The summer forecast was grim. A state renowned for Hollywood magic and Silicon Valley innovation faced financial ruin. Thirty days of rolling blackouts were projected. Some warned that the sick and elderly could die when life-support equipment flickered off. Those dire predictions never came true, but the crisis that consumed the state earlier this year hasn't gone away. "The days of energy blackouts are over," said Peter Navarro, an associate professor of business at the University of California at Irvine. "Now we're faced with financial blackouts." California survived by conserving energy, building enough new plants to power 1.5 million homes and buying power from merchant generators. Unusually mild summer weather also helped the cause. "We tamed the tiger," said S. David Freeman, the governor's outspoken energy czar who now serves as chairman of the newly created California Power Authority. "But it can still bite." Taxpayers are out billions of dollars, the state's largest utility is in bankruptcy court, and ratepayers have been saddled with the biggest electricity hikes in state history. In early January, Gov. Gray Davis and the Legislature devised a scheme to begin using tax dollars to buy power on behalf of the utilities, spending billions of tax dollars but stabilizing a market that had crumbled into chaos. The state spent $6 billion buying electricity, and efforts to issue a revenue bond that would pay taxpayers back have been stymied by a political rift between Davis and the state's Public Utilities Commission. The spending spree ate up a huge budget surplus that could have helped a state now reeling from recession, financial experts say. The long-term contracts -- worth an estimated $43 billion -- that Davis signed in the spring lock consumers into high energy prices for a decade. Critics like Navarro say the governor had to sign contracts to get the state out of the spot market, where prices were racing upward. But Davis signed too many deals in a decision Navarro says will go down "as one of the worst public policy moves in state history." Davis hopes to renegotiate the contracts as the state now finds itself in the embarrassing position of having to sell surplus power. A Chronicle analysis of planned power purchases shows consumers will lose more than $3.9 billion through 2010 on electricity the state will sell for a loss. The analysis is based on the Department of Water Resources projections of future electricity prices and the projected surpluses created by the long- term contracts. But state officials say the record rate hikes enacted this year -- residential rates jumped by 62 percent for PG&E customers -- won't go any higher. "Rates have reached their peak," Freeman said. Higher rates weren't the biggest concern for some. When blackouts struck Northern California over two days in January and then rolled across the state in March, Shannon Cashman of Walnut Creek was terrified. Cashman's 5-year-old daughter, Madison, has a rare condition that causes her to stop breathing if she falls asleep and isn't hooked up to a respirator. To keep Madison from taking her usual naps, Cashman played games of Candyland with her during afternoon blackouts. "It was scary," Cashman recalled. While individual Californians struggled to save kilowatts, lawmakers scrambled to resolve energy issues many later admitted were too complicated for a quick political fix. An energy market poorly designed by the Legislature in 1996 was thrown into turmoil by a series of events that led to energy shortages. Soaring natural gas prices, a dearth of hydroelectric power from the Northwest and scores of power plants shuttered for maintenance created the unstable market, said Bill Marcus, an economist who studies California's energy markets. Those problems -- coupled with the state's deregulation laws, which forbade utilities from raising consumer rates -- meant utilities could not recover their costs. "The market failed in so many ways that no one could have dreamed of," Marcus said. With the control room of the state's Independent System Operator, which is responsible for running the power grid, beginning to feel like a trading floor on Wall Street, Davis made attacks from his bully pulpit. The Democratic governor vilified Texas energy companies -- which were seen as gouging California. Davis called on federal regulators to step in and implement price caps on wholesale electricity. They finally did in June. Davis was criticized for not taking action on the energy issue earlier in 2000, when San Diego residents saw their electric bills skyrocket and experts began to warn that a financial meltdown was coming. San Diego's utility was the first to complete the transition to deregulation. "Who knows how it would have turned out if anyone had acted earlier, if rates had gone up, or the utilities had contracted for power," said state Sen. Debra Bowen, D-Marina del Rey, chair of the Senate Energy, Utilities and Communications Committee. Davis also inaugurated conservation programs and urged Californians to change their habits. They did. More than 30 percent of Californians earned a rebate on their power bills by cutting their usage by 20 percent. An energy fair at San Francisco City Hall drew crowds akin to a rock concert; Home Depot reported a 265 percent increase in sales of compact fluorescent light bulbs. "The headline is that Californians did more than we thought possible," said Scott Matthews, deputy director of energy efficiency for the California Energy Commission. Summer conservation numbers delighted experts like Matthews. June electricity usage was down 12 percent from the year before. On June 21, Californians used 4,000 megawatts less during peak demand hours than on the same day the year before -- enough to power about 4 million homes. Conservation has waned this fall, but Matthews said the number of new, efficient appliances inside California homes will help the state save power for years. This month -- one year after the state's first-ever Stage 3 power alert brought the energy crisis to the forefront -- California's energy market is again at a place few could have predicted. Some of the ironies: -- Houston's Enron Corp., which a year ago was a billion-dollar company with presidential access and the inside track to becoming the champion of energy deregulation, has filed for bankruptcy and come under scrutiny by federal regulators. The company has begged California to sell it megawatts to serve its clients. -- Big power companies like Mirant Inc. and Reliant Energy Inc. -- still under investigation by the California attorney general for possibly withholding power during the crisis to drive up prices -- have told the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that state power buyers unfairly manipulated the market to bypass them in favor of companies signed to long- term contracts. -- Some worry that the state is so flush with energy that greater conservation efforts could cost ratepayers money by forcing the state to sell more electricity for a loss. With nine new power plants on line this year and more than 20 scheduled to fire up next year, the Energy Commission predicts supply won't be a problem as long as Californians continue to conserve and the weather isn't extreme. The state power authority, created by the governor and the Legislature to lend $5 billion to energy projects, has shifted its focus from building plants dependent on natural gas to funding solar power and other renewable generators. But billion-dollar questions remain. Whether a bond to pay back the general fund will ever be issued is unclear. The uncertainty already has caused credit-rating services to lower the state's bond ratings, which raises the state's interest costs for future borrowing. The Public Utilities Commission will decide in the next few months whether many big businesses will be allowed to avoid paying the same high electricity rates as homeowners and small businesses. Large-scale energy users took advantage of a key component of deregulation to sign "direct access" contracts with private energy suppliers this summer. The PUC could nullify those contracts. And plans by both PG&E and Southern California Edison to get back into fiscal shape have been drubbed by energy experts, who say both companies want to avoid regulation while making their comeback. How those issues will play out -- and the role they will play in the coming gubernatorial race -- will be the energy story for 2002. Whatever the solutions, economists and consumer advocates say it will not be the utilities or the energy giants that will foot the bills for the damage left by the post-deregulation energy crisis. "We have met the shareholders, and the shareholders are us," Marcus said. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- State, federal agencies probing crisis The energy crisis gave rise to several investigations by state and federal agencies: -- California Senate Committee to Investigate Price Manipulation of the Wholesale Energy Market: Led by state Sen. Joseph Dunn, D-Santa Ana, the committee has examined several aspects of the energy crisis. Committee staffers are examining documents from energy companies accused of withholding energy to drive up prices. The committee also has taken testimony from state power grid officials accused by generators of manipulating the market to their benefit, and Dunn has said he will probe the sale of power plants to out-of- state generators in the 1990s and its relationship to the ensuing crisis. -- California Attorney General Bill Lockyer: Convened a grand jury in June to investigate whether power companies manipulated the power market during the energy crisis. Lockyer also is looking into complaints that consultants hired by Gov. Gray Davis to negotiate contracts with energy providers had illegal ties to the companies. -- California Public Utilities Commission: Continuing a broad investigation into the origins of the state's energy problems and whether the market for power was manipulated. -- U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: Will not comment on its own investigations, but two energy consultants hired by Davis have acknowledged the SEC has contacted them about allegations of insider trading. The two men allegedly bought and sold energy-related stock while working for the state. -- California Fair Political Practices Commission: Investigating whether the governor's office erred in not requiring several consultants hired to handle the energy crisis to fill out forms indicating investments and other economic interests.

2001年12月24日 17時58分23秒

Market ebbs under Calpine

Saturday, December 15, 2001 001 San Francisco Chronicle URL: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/12/15/BU22945.DTL In another blow to Calpine Corp., Moody's Investors Service cut the credit rating of the San Jose power producer yesterday to junk status, sending its shares tumbling to a two-year low. The credit agency lowered the rating to the below-investment grade of "Ba1, " raising doubts about Calpine's ability to repay $11.6 billion of bonds, and warned that further cuts are possible. Only two months ago, Calpine held a "Baa3" rating, the lowest investment grade. Moody's said it took the action because the power company faces a significant debt burden in the face of modest operating profits. Calpine's unsettled situation has rattled investors, causing its stock to fall $2.85 -- or 18 percent -- yesterday to $13.20. In after-hours trading, following Moody's rate cut, the stock dropped further, to $12.70. Fitch Inc., another rating agency, put Calpine on its "negative" watch list yesterday. Although Calpine's "operating fundamentals are sound," its plans to add 18 generating plants next year and double power production are "not consistent with the current market environment," Fitch said. The downgrade from Moody's could hamper Calpine's ability to raise capital and finance its ambitious growth plans. Enron ended up filing for bankruptcy protection after its credit rating was reduced. In the past week, Calpine's shares have skidded 38 percent after a New York Times article on Sunday drew troubling parallels between the power company's situation and the collapse of debt-laden energy trader Enron. Calpine chief executive Peter Cartwright called the comparisons to Enron "ridiculous," pointing out that the bankrupt Houston energy company was "asset- light" and generated most of its revenues from trading, while Calpine has plenty of assets, including 69 power plants, and generates only 20 percent of its revenues from trading. Also yesterday, Lehman Brothers analyst Daniel Ford lowered his rating on Calpine's stock to "market perform" from "strong buy." Meanwhile Commerzbank Securities analyst Andre Meade cut his rating to "hold" from "accumulate." However, several analysts still believe strongly in Calpine. Gerard Klauer Mattison analyst Michael Worms maintained his $2.65 earnings per share estimate for the company next year, saying Calpine has the financial flexibility to raise the $2.5 billion to complete its 17,000-megawatt construction program even if the debt markets are closed. For example, he said the company could "monetize" its 1.7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, sell and lease back existing projects or seek partners for projects under construction. Calpine said it still hopes to complete a $1.5 billion credit arrangement with lenders. Although some critics have mentioned that Calpine has off-balance-sheet debt, like Enron, it is a tiny fraction of Calpine's debt load. Indeed, Calpine's debt has declined to $190 million from $300 million at the end of September when Calpine bought out partner Bechtel Group's interests in three Bay Area power plant projects. Worms acknowledged that the weak economy, mild weather and crisis of confidence in the wake of Enron's collapse are pressuring Calpine. But he believes the company could emerge with the "lowest-cost, most efficient generating fleet in the country." Calpine spokeswoman Katherine Potter said the company plans to move ahead with plans to double generating capacity next year. "Despite the market hysteria, the fundamentals of our business have not changed since October," she said. "We plan to move forward with our aggressive program to develop 30 new plants, including 18 scheduled for completion next year. But if market conditions change or the economies of a project change, we wouldn't move forward." On Wednesday, the Standard & Poor's credit-rating agency affirmed its "BB+" rating, saying the company has sufficient liquidity to finance its construction projects. Calpine was not the only energy company under the gun yesterday. Dynegy Holdings, a unit of Houston's Dynegy Inc., had its credit ratings cut to "Baa3" by Moody's, which said it might cut the ratings even further. Dynegy shares fell $1.64 to $24.94 during trading and dipped to $23 in after-hours trading.

2001年12月16日 14時21分26秒

State energy spending plunges (Tuesday, November 13, 2001)

URL: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/chronicle/archive/2001/11/13/MN64484.DTL Sacramento -- The state's spending on energy plummeted in October to its lowest level this year, according to figures released yesterday by the Department of Water Resources. California spent $415 million on power purchases in October, half of what it spent in August and $264 million less than in September. Since January, the state has been purchasing power for the three investor- owned utilities. At the market's peak, the cost of power was an average of $65 million a day. October's average was $13.4 million a day. "These steep declines in our overall power expenses are an obvious signal that California has accomplished the task of controlling what were once runaway costs in the spot market," said Pete Garris, acting deputy director of the Department of Water Resources, which is in charge of buying the state's power. "Each month since May, California has been able to slash hundreds of millions of dollars off its costs," Garris said. "These overall costs are a good measure of how successful we've been in lowering the price of energy." However, the department said it did not have figures for how much power the state sold last month. Without those numbers, consumer advocates say, it is impossible to know how well the state is doing. "We need to know the entire picture," said Nettie Hoge, executive director of The Utility Reform Network. "If we bought too much and are selling it at a loss, we need to know that." Hoge said this is especially important as the state begins to try to renegotiate long-term power contracts. Gov. Gray Davis and his administration began negotiating and signing long- term contracts during the height of the energy crisis. Davis and others say the contracts helped drive down the price of power, but critics say the state locked in too much power at too high a price. For the three months ending in June, the state sold about $25 million worth of power, at times even giving electricity away. "We may need to take a broader look at the contracts," Hoge said. "The downturn in natural gas prices has made a huge difference." That's because much of the electricity on the market is produced by plants that run on natural gas. Although the Davis administration has said it is open to renegotiating the contracts, it has made no progress thus far. A spokesman for the department said numbers detailing how much power the state has sold will be available later this month.

2001年11月26日 12時24分29秒

バークレー校留学に関して

1.はじめに 　私は、平成11年６月末より２年間、カリフォルニア大学（ＵＣ）バークレー校に留学する機会を得ましたので、ここに専攻したコンストラクション・マネージメント（以下ＣＭ）・プログラムの概要と修士論文、米国生活などについて簡単にご説明することにいたします。 ２．ＵＣバークレー校について 2-1 大学の概要 　バークレーの町は、カリフォルニア州北部、サンフランシスコ、サンノゼを含むベイ・エリアと呼ばれる地域に位置しています。大学はバークレーの街からベイ・エリアを望む小高い丘の中腹まで広がっており、サンフランシスコの摩天楼とゴールデン・ゲイトを一望することのできるたいへん景色の良い場所にあります(写真-1)。 　ＵＣバークレー校の特徴は、創立が1868年とたいへん古く、ＵＣＬＡを含む９つのキャンパスからなるカリフォルニア州立大学の本校にあたること、学生数が３万人とマンモス校であること、1960年代にベトナム反戦運動が起こるなど、政治・社会に対する学生の反応が強いこと、などが挙げられます。 2-2 大学のプログラム 　専攻したＣＭのプログラムは、大学院のプログラムの中でも、より実社会に近い学問であり、建設分野に関するビジネス・スクールと言って良い内容です。主な内容は下記の４分野です。 (1) プロジェクト・マネージメント (2) ライフ・サイクルを考慮した 効率的な設備設計 (3) リーン・コンストラクション（建設生産の効率改善理論） (4) リスク・マネージメント 　ＣＭといえば、(1)の内容で代表されるように建設プロジェクトの予算管理、工程管理を行い、プロジェクトの採算性を上げることですが、バークレー校では、現在、(3)のリーン（Lean＝スリムな）・コンストラクションに焦点が置かれています。リーン・コンストラクションとは、日本ではまだなじみのない言葉であるかもしれませんが、電子商取引、サプライ・チェーン・マネージメント、ＣＡＤなどを統合し、建設現場での生産性を向上することを指します。米国では、1980年代後半に自動車メーカーなどがトヨタのジャスト・イン・タイム工法を多くの工場に導入し、飛躍的に生産効率の向上を図りましたが、このシステムをそのまま建設現場に応用することで、工程内で極力ムダな点を省いて、効率を大きく上げようとする試みがなされています。１）。 修士号を取得するプログラムとしては、マスター・オブ・サイエンス（ＭＳ：１年間のコース）とマスター・オブ・エンジニアリング（ＭＥ：２年間コース）とがあり、前者は最低24単位と卒業試験、後者は最低 40単位と修士論文が必要となります。私は、修士論文を書くことにより、ある一つのテーマに絞って内容を深く追求することができるＭＥを選択いたしました。特に修士論文では、前述(4)リスク・マネージメントの手法に従い、プロジェクトに起こり得る各種リスクの大きさを定量化し、その影響度を最小化する方法を学ぶこととしました。 ３．修士論文について 　私の修士論文のテーマは、ＣＭのプログラムで学んだこと、カリフォルニア州における電力政策、電力危機に関する情報を極力活かすことを考え、「米国における風力発電ビジネスに必要なリスク・マネージメント」としました。 　修士論文の構成は下記に示すように大きく分けて３つの内容から成ります。 a) 米国風力発電ビジネスのリスク・マネージメント b) カリフォルニア州で生じた電力危機の原因分析 c) オンライン・風資源情報提供ビジネスの提案 3-1 米国の風力発電ビジネス 　昨年２月、私は知人のいる上越教育大学の社会科教科書作成チームから、「米国の環境・エネルギーに関する調査」の一環としてサンフランシスコ近郊アルタモントにある世界的なウインド・ファーム見学を行うということで、調査の随行を依頼されました２）。先方の目的は、カリフォルニア州が米国の中でも進んでクリーン・エネルギーについて取り組んでおり、日本の今後のエネルギーについて考えたとき、もっと風力を導入するべきではないのか、米国のシステムを見習うべきでないのかとの観点から、エネルギー政策を調査することにありました。 　カリフォルニア州では、総発電電力量の約12％を再生可能エネルギーが占めており、1980年より世界に先駆けて風力発電を開発してきたことは有名です。しかし、米国の風力発電ビジネスに関し、私は疑問を抱いており、事業としては採算の合わない、リスクの大きなビジネスであることを感じていました。実際、初めてアルタモントのウインド・ファームを見学したときには、その壮観（5,400機のタービン）に驚いたものの、現在ではおよそ半数が機械の故障と寿命（約20年）に達したことにより運転を停止しており、放置されているだけでなく、多くの会社が今までに倒産・合併していることを知っていました。そこで、私は上越教育大学のチームが抱いていた印象に対して、「米国は本当に環境・エネルギーに関する優れたシステムを持っているのか？」について追求したいと思いました。このことから、私は修論の中で米国における風力発電開発の歴史、風力発電ビジネスに及ぼすリスクおよびその影響度について調べることにしました。 　私が研究の中で興味深い事実として着目したことは、米国の風力発電業界は現在までに２度の大きな好景気と不況を経験しており、中でも80年代に世界的なパイオニアであったケネテック社が96年に経営を破綻し、倒産していることです。倒産の直接的な原因は、発電価格を5セント/kWh以下に抑えることが可能とされていた300kW新型タービンKVS-33(写真-2)の荷重設計に欠陥があり、その取替えに多額の費用を要したことです。歴史的な背景を調べていくと、70年代における石油価格の高騰により連邦および州が税制優遇などでクリーン・エネルギー開発を全面的に支援するようになってきたものの（例えば、PURPA(1978）)、ひとたび、ガス及び石油価格が下がると、その都度電力政策が変わり、税制優遇が廃止されるなど、競争市場でクリーン・エネルギーが生き残ることが非常に困難な時期があったという事実を知りました。 　実際にケネテック社のエンジニアにインタビューを行う機会をもちましたが、91年の湾岸戦争以降、米国のガス・石油価格はどんどん下がり、95年のカリフォルニア州電力市場における回避可能原価は、それまでの4〜5セントから2.5セント/kWhまで低下したため、あおりを受けたケネテック社は大きなリストラを行ったということです。これにより、技術者が必要数よりも大きく削減され、設計時における十分なチェック機能が行われなくなり、結果的にタービンKVS-33の欠陥につながったという情報を得ました。 　カリフォルニア州は、確かに全米で最もクリーン・エネルギーの開発を行ってきた州です。しかし、その開発が市民の強い環境意識により行われてきたのではなく、ガス・石油価格が高騰した時のために、州独自のエネルギー資源を有効に活かしていくための手段として開発されてきたのです。実際、1995年にはサザン・カリフォルニア・エジソン社がPU-RPAにより購入義務があるとされていた風力IPPからの電力購入を不当に拒否しましたが、結局は自由化への体制の動きを考慮されて承認されています。このような経緯から、私は米国風力発電ビジネスの成否が、主に風資源のもつ不安定性（稼働率、出力変動）に左右されるのではなく、競争市場におけるガス・石油価格の変動で決まるものと結論づけました。 3-2 風力発電のポテンシャル 　以上より、私は米国の風力発電ビジネスに関してネガティブな意見を持っていましたが、今年３月にカリフォルニア州にあるテハチャピ（世界最大のサイト（97年の総出力618MW））とパーム・スプリングス（写真-2）のウインド・ファームを見学したことにより、考えが180度変わりました。驚くことにそれらの地域には、今までにほとんど体験したことのないような速度の風が吹いていました。特にパーム・スプリングスでは、屋外で立っていることが不快に感じるほどの風速を感じました。当地の１年間の平均風速は18〜25mph（＝8〜 11m/s）とのことです。これは、独特の地形に起因するもので、太平洋からの海風がサンゴルゴニオの標高3,000m級の２つのピークによってさえぎられ、その山間部をチューブ効果（ゴムホースを絞ったときに勢い良くでる水のような効果）により、強風が東部の砂漠地帯へと向かって吹いていました。このように、実際にウインド・ファームとして採算が取れると思われる絶好の自然条件の場所があることを知ったことは、またとない経験であったと思います。 3-3 電力危機およびそこから考案したビジネスについて 　カリフォルニア州の電力危機については、世界に先駆けた自由化により将来の体制が見えない中で発電所建設が10年以上にわたり見送られてきたこと、市場原理の働かない欠陥のあるシステムが導入されたこと、供給責任をとるべき箇所が不明確であったことなど、周知のとおり、さまざまな原因が指摘されています。私のアパートに輪番停電（ローリング・ブラックアウト）はヒットしませんでしたが、通学途中の路上で信号が動いておらず、大渋滞となっている箇所を数カ所目にし、問題の大きさを実感いたしました。 　修論のアイデアを練っている中で、私は思いもしなかった情報を耳にしました。電力需給の逼迫するカリフォルニア州において、今年になり家庭用の小型風力タービン（通常10kW以下）の需要が例年になく増加しているという事実です。サンフランシスコ・クロニクル誌でもこの事実に着目し、「As power prices rise,　windmills are one way to decreasecosts (2/27)」と記事として取り上げています。小型風力タービンの大手製造会社であるBergey Windpower 社では、カリフォルニア州におけるタービン売上げが今年１月だけで40基にもなりました。過去2年間はトータルで20基も売れていなかった事実を考慮すると、いかに市民が電力危機の影響による電気料金高騰に敏感に反応しているかがわかります。この事実より、私は修論の中で「個人用小型風力発電に必要なオンライン風資源情報提供サービス事業」のビジネス・プランを行うことにしました。 　このアイデアは、カリフォルニア州が電力危機に瀕し、今年になって電気料金値上げを段階的に実施していること、州政府が自家発電購入者に対する下記のようなインセンティブを設定していることから生まれました。 ・20/20 Plan: 昨年夏の消費量と比較 して、今年夏に20%以上の電気を節電 すれば、20%のリベートを州から受けることができる ・50% Buy-down Program：小型風力タ ービン購入者に対して、本体価格・設置費の50%を州が負担 ・Net Metering System：自家発電を行った場合、余った電気を電力会社　に売ることができる 　現状のマーケットでは、米国の小型タービン製造業数社がオンライン・ビジネスをすでに始めている（例えば、Bergey社）ものの、タービン購入者が自家発電を効率良く行うために必要な地域レベルの風資源情報を提供していないという問題点があります。そこで、私は、National Climatic Data Centerの気象データとEPA (Environmental Protection Agency)による1kmメッシュの地形図データ・ベースとを組み合わせた詳細なオンライン風資源データ・ベースを確立し、顧客のニーズに合う最適なタービンを米国の製造業社の中から推薦し、購入までの手続きを全てオンライン上で行うサービスを提案することとしました。 　このビジネス・プランの背景ですが、倒産状態にある電力会社に代わって州政府が今年１月より行っている「長期電力調達契約」が、電力危機の根本的な解決策とは見られておらず、少なくとも2004年までは高騰する需要に対して供給が追いついていけない状態にあり、緊急の対策が望まれていることです。特に今年の夏の供給不足量は5,000MW（州全体の想定需要量：61,125MW）と見込まれており、これに対してガスタービン・ベースのピーカー・プラントを急ピッチで設置することにより不足量5,000MWの43%をまかない、あとは新規電源の運開と停止中の電源のリパワリングにより埋め合わせを行う計画がありました。しかし、ピーカー・プラントの製造が需要に追いつけなくなっている現状や、高騰する天然ガス価格の影響によりピーカー・プラントが新たな電気料金高騰を招くというのは必至とのさまざまな問題点が指摘されていました。 　そこで、州政府は前述の「20/20 Plan」を進め、市民の節電・省エネルギーを勧めていました。実際、この効果は抜群であり、昨年と比較して今年５月のカリフォルニア州民の電力消費量は11％も下回り（サンフランシスコ・クロニクル誌(6/4)）、多くの市民がリベートを受けたとのことです。このように消費者側の努力が実際に大きな数字として現れたわけですが、とりわけ３月27日に州公益事業委員会により発表された電気料金の高騰（全体で約40％のアップ）に対する反響が大きかったものと私は感じました。 3-4 小型風力タービンについて 　さて、小型風力タービンとは、一般に定格出力10kW以下のタービン（正確にはロータの受風面積が40ｍ２以下）のことをさしますが、家庭用タービンとなると３kW程度になります。この程度のタービンの価格および設置費用は、8,000ドルから10,000ドル程度であり、これは米国の平均的な中古車価格程度です。しかし、10kW以下のタービンであれば、州より50%のリベート（50% Buy-down Pr-ogram）があるため、実際にはこの価格の半額となります。10kWのタービン（32,000ドル程度）であれば、一月に900〜1,500kWh程度発電できるとのことです。現状では、タービン購入者が自分で風資源を調査することはないと考えられ、タービン製造会社の下請け企業が風況を調査し、適切な機種の選定を行います。したがって、全米で10数種ある小型タービン製造会社の中から、購入者が自分で最適機種を選定することは困難であり、経済性追求のための事前風況調査には多大な時間を要するものと思われます。以上のことから、カリフォルニア州にターゲットをしぼった都市近郊の小型タービン購入者向けの風資源情報提供システムは、購入者自らがオンライン上で機種を選定でき、省エネルギーを推進することのできるアイデア型ビジネスと考えました。 ４．最後に 　留学期間は２年間でしたが、大学生活だけでなく、電力危機に直面し、市民としてその問題について考えることができたこと、米国にある世界的な３大ウインド・ファームを見学することができたことなど、非常に貴重な経験をさせていただいたと実感しております。現在、海外事業の業務に携わっておりますが、プロジェクト・マネージメントに関するノウハウ、電力自由化のシステムなど、米国での留学生活で学んだことを活かし、事業拡大に少しでも多く貢献していきたいと考えております。

2001年11月21日 12時27分29秒

Despite the energy crisis, Altamont wind farms are . . .FROZEN IN TIME

Despite the energy crisis, Altamont wind farms are . . .FROZEN IN TIME By Matt Carter STAFF WRITER (The Oakland Tribune) Article last updated:　Monday, February 26, 2001 1:15 PM MST PLEASANTON -- As the amount of electricity generated by aging windmills in the Altamont Pass dwindles, long-anticipated plans to "repower" the pass with more modern machines are again on hold. After first being delayed by a lawsuit, repowering is now stalled by the financial uncertainties the state's energy crisis has created for wind farm operators. With Pacific Gas & Electric Co. on the verge of bankruptcy, it remains to be seen how wind farm operators will be paid for the electricity they generate. Just when California's power woes have renewed public interest in renewable energy sources like the wind and sun, the development of wind power in the Altamont seems frozen in time. To Jan C. Paulin, president and chief executive officer of one Altamont wind farm operator, SeaWest WindPower Inc., it's "distressing to drive through the pass and see all that junk lying around out there." When they're not down for repairs -- and when there's enough wind to spin their weighty blades -- the roughly 5,400 windmills remaining in the pass produce only about half the power generated there in 1994, when wind energy pro- duction in California peaked. There's still enough electricity generated in the Altamont to supply about 100,000 homes. But altogether, wind turbines around the state deliver only about 1 percent of California's power needs. The untapped potential in the Altamont seems wasteful, and the conclusion drawn by some who see idle or abandoned wind machines -- that wind farms depend on tax subsidies and can't survive on their own -- can reflect poorly on the entire industry, Paulin said. "Most people think (wind power) is still a little fluky, and probably the biggest contributor to that perception is the Altamont Pass. I can't tell you how many people I've talked to -- from all over the world -- who cite the Altamont Pass as an example of how dismal wind power is. It looks awful." It's a distinct contrast to the situation 20 years ago, when the first large-scale efforts to turn the energy of the wind into electricity were getting under way. Back then, the Altamont Pass was the place to be. Drawn by lucrative tax incentives and steady winds, engineers and entrepreneurs built more than 7,000 power-producing windmills on rolling ranchland between Livermore and Tracy. For a time, it was the largest concentration of wind farms on the planet -- and a major reason that, in the 1980s, California produced more than 90 percent of the world's wind power. By today's standards, some of those early windmills -- or wind turbines, as they are known in the industry -- were crude and unreliable. When state and federal subsidies evaporated, many of the companies that built and operated the first pioneering machines went belly up. Today, rising energy prices, worries about global warming and a new generation of bigger and more efficient wind turbines are driving a new wave of wind-farm construction around the world. But there are few signs of the wind-power renaissance in the Altamont, where no wind farms have been approved for 12 years. That picture could begin to change this year, when plans to replace obsolete wind turbines in the pass are expected to get under way. The fate of those plans depends in part on the same economic and policy issues that exist elsewhere in the world -- variables such as energy prices and the availability of government subsidies. But perhaps the biggest uncertainty faced by wind farm operators in the Altamont stems from an environmental problem not anticipated in 1980, when the state designated the pass as one of the top three sites for wind power in California. Ironically, wind turbines -- otherwise regarded as a clean and largely benign source of energy -- kill birds. Until wind farm operators in the Altamont Pass can prove that the next generation of machines will be less lethal to eagles, hawks and owls, they aren't being allowed to build additional generating capacity. REPOWERING PLAN Under a 1998 plan to repower local wind farms, the number of new machines allowed was tied to each company's existing generating capacity. SeaWest, for example, has permission to replace all but ||012 . 0040.06||one of the wind turbines it operates in the pass -- but only with enough larger machines to equal the company's existing generating capacity of about 25 megawatts. Alameda County planners estimate the total generating capacity of all wind turbines remaining in the Altamont -- whether they're running or not -- at about 580 megawatts. One megawatt is enough to supply the electric demands of about 1,000 homes. But because the wind doesn't blow all the time, and wind turbines break down, wind farms typically generate about 20 to 30 percent of their rated capacity. Depending on the model of wind turbine used, SeaWest could install as many as 50 larger machines in exchange for removing 432 old ones. If every wind farm operator in the Altamont Pass followed suit, the 5,400 wind turbines in the pass could theoretically be replaced by less than 1,000 state-of-the art machines. Repowering on that scale could boost the net amount of clean energy flowing out of the Altamont past record 1994 levels -- even if the cap on new generating capacity remained in place. That's because new wind turbines are not only more reliable than their predecessors but more efficient at turning the energy of the wind into electricity. The hope is that reducing the total number of wind turbines, and avoiding known trouble spots in siting new machines, will reduce the number of bird deaths. If there are fewer bird deaths, the cap on new generation capacity could be lifted. But if the industry can't prove that fewer birds are dying in areas that have been repowered, wind farm operators in the Altamont could face prosecution by wildlife regulators. The cap on new generation would remain, stifling the economic incentives for investing in the pass. The first opportunity to gauge the effects of repowering in the Altamont is expected when SeaWest and two rival companies exercise permits allowing them to replace about 1,300 older wind turbines. Alameda County officials approved most of those permits more than two years ago -- in December 1998. The remaining permits, covering 257 wind turbines in Contra Costa County, were approved in November 1999. The permits have never been acted on, in part because investors in neighboring windfarms sued to stop repowering, claiming the project would disrupt wind to their turbines. A confidential March 2000 settlement resolved this issue. WILL IT PAY? With the lawsuit resolved, it's largely economics driving decisions about when the first stage of repowering in the Altamont moves forward. For now, Paulin said, SeaWest has no plans to exercise its permits. Although the company has pursued repowering projects elsewhere -- near Palm Springs, for example, where the company replaced about 500 older machines in San Gorgonio pass with 62 modern turbines -- it is not rushing to invest more money in the Altamont. The company would be hard-pressed to justify repowering such a small amount of generating capacity, Paulin said. That's even more true, he said, given current uncertainties about what the company will be paid for its electricity and whether a 1.5-cents-per-kilowatt-hour federal tax subsidy will be allowed to expire at the end of the year. "It's all about economy of scale," Paulin said. "In our case, our old turbines actually work. We don't have any of the ones lying on the ground broken." Paulin said SeaWest would be much more likely to move ahead with repowering if it were allowed to build new capacity -- about four times as much as it has now. "If you could make it a 100-megawatt project, then things look entirely different," Paulin said. "We haven't pushed this very hard in the past, but if we thought (political) winds were blowing on the county level that were amenable to more power in the Altamont, we would certainly look into that." While SeaWest's plans are on hold, two rival companies with the go-ahead to replace about 870 wind turbines say they could have their new machines up and running by the end of the year. Those companies, Green Ridge Power LLC and and Altamont Power Co., are renegotiating the long-term contracts that govern the sale of their power to PG&E. The companies are also negotiating with landowners who lease their property in exchange for a cut of revenue from the wind farms. "The important thing right now is for PG&E to become solvent to the point where I can go to my board and ask for $100 million and not have them laugh at me," said Ed Taylor, project manager for M and N Windpower. A global wind farm developer with offices in California, London and Montreal, M and N Windpower is a partner in Green Ridge and Altamont Power with Florida-based FPL Energy. (FPL Energy, whose parent company FPL Group owns the regulated utility Florida Power and Light, has a 50 percent stake in Green Ridge and Altamont Power.) PG&E, like Southern California Edison, has racked up billions in debt under deregulation because it must pay more for electricity on the open market than it is allowed to charge customers. Because of that debt, it hasn't been able to pay wind farm operators for the power they've generated since November. Plans to modernize wind farms in the Altamont depend on their backers getting satisfactory answers to a nagging question: Who will buy their power, and under what terms? PG&E buys all the power produced by wind farms in the Altamont Pass under long-term contracts it was required to enter into by a 1978 federal act intended to promote the development of alternative energy sources. Today, both utilities and wind farm operators have incentives for wanting to renegotiate or cancel those 20 and 30-year contracts, which tie the price of wind energy to natural gas prices. Utilities saw the price of wind energy nearly triple in one month -- from 6 cents per kilowatt hour in November to 16 cents in December, said PG&E spokesman Jon Tremayne. But the price PG&E pays for electricity on the "dysfunctional and broken" open market has risen even more rapidly -- to as much as 30 to 40 cents per kilowatt hour -- Tremayne said. In general, wind farm operators want to be in a better position to take advantage of rising energy prices, while utilities want to be free to buy power from the cheapest available source. But long-term contracts can still be helpful in making plans for the future, because they insulate all parties from volatile price swings. BLESSING IN DISGUISE? In some ways, the delays that put repowering smack in the middle of the state's energy crisis have also been a blessing, Taylor said. The new 800-kilowatt, Danish-made wind turbine Green Ridge and Altamont Power plan to install is an improvement over the less powerful machine being considered two years ago. Factor in a more favorable currency exchange rate, and the prospects for repowering start to look even better. "We have a better turbine, and the value of the dollar . . . has almost made the wait worthwhile," Taylor said. Green Ridge Power also will see a less obvious benefit -- new resources to throw into the never-ending battle to keep its remaining 100-kilowatt wind turbines on line. Right now, maintenance technicians do an "unbelievable" job keeping Green Ridge and Altamont Power's 2,100 old machines on line, Taylor said. But keeping the wind turbines available to turn the wind into electricity 93 to 97 percent of the time isn't cheap. Repowering will help solve part of that problem, because it will yield an almost unlimited supply of spare parts. Another attraction of repowering is that it can be cheaper than building a new wind farm elsewhere from scratch. Much of the needed infrastructure, such as maintenance roads and power lines that carry electricity to the grid, is already in place. In addition, some of the costs of developing a new wind farm -- evaluating the long-term qualities of wind at a site, for example -- don't apply. But in practice, Taylor said, repowering in the Altamont will cost about the same as building a new wind energy project -- about $1 million per megawatt of generating capacity. "What's driven the price of the repower up are the legal costs and the financing costs -- because the lenders are a lot more sophisticated," Taylor said. Green Ridge and Altamont Power are proposing to replace about 870 older wind turbines with 137 new machines. The total generating capacity of the new machines would equal those replaced: 109 megawatts. Using Taylor's $1 million-per-megawatt estimate, Green Ridge and Altamont Power are preparing to invest about $110 million in the pass. Depending on how successful repowering is in reducing the number of birds killed, that investment could pave the way for future expansions -- or usher in the wind industry's last hurrah in the Altamont Pass.[026][255] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ©1999-2001 by MediaNews Group, Inc. and ANG Newspapers

2001年11月18日 23時40分46秒

Online Wind Resource Database Business

BUSINESS SUMMARY WindResource.com is an online broker that provides accurate wind resource information (e.g., wind speed, air density, etc.) in California and suggests which wind turbines would be most effective and efficient for each individual customer. Our potential customers, who are mainly municipal governments, residences, offices, can purchase turbines through our website. WindResource.com shows essential data on its website for those who want to install small wind turbines in their own sites. The website has three main attributes. First, the company presents local wind resource information that is linked to meteorological weather data. Presently, most wind power developers are still referring to the "Wind Energy Resource Atlas,” published by the U.S. Department of Energy in 1993, which only shows useful information for utility-scale large wind farms. The “Wind Energy Resource Atlas” has insufficient data for each local community. Therefore, more accurate and practical wind resource data has long been expected as a valuable tool for home wind energy systems. Second, WindResource.com collaborates with major wind turbine manufacturers in the U.S. Its website can provide the best wind turbines and wind resources to customers in accordance with their needs. Thus, each customer only needs to enter his or her address on the website in order to get the most effective and inexpensive turbine for their location. Third, the website is linked with Cal-ISO website. This means customers can easily get current and forecasted power supply and demand data in California. By checking our website, customers can predict electricity shortages and not only prepare themselves for possible blackouts with their turbines but also sell their surplus electricity to utilities (Net Metering). Our vision is mainly based on the fact that Californian's interest in home wind generators has increased sharply since the beginning of this year in response to the state's prolonged energy crisis that has made daily headlines and raised customer fears of rate shock. In this environment, the demand for our business is expected to increase exponentially. Now, people in California are tired of being at the mercy of cash-strapped utilities and are beginning to try to conserve electricity. People will begin to realize a small wind system is their best way to further insulate themselves from these rate increases. Fortunately, the state provides several incentives for renewable energy systems. For example, $50 million in rebates for construction of small alternative energy facilities and a 50% tax credit for homeowners and businesses that install renewable energy systems are two main incentives. Moreover, under Net Metering by law, excess electricity produced by the wind turbine will spin the existing home or business electricity meter backwards, effectively banking the electricity until it is needed by the customer. This provides the customer with full retail value for all the electricity produced. Indeed, some competitors, such as Bergey Windpower Co., Inc., have already embarked on the online wind turbine business for homeowners; however nobody has offered an integrated wind resource website as WindResource.com is offering it’s customers. We believe WindResource.com will need about $200,000 to start. Our first option is to propose our idea to electric companies, such as Tokyo Electric Power Company, that may be interested in investing. We assume we can raise up to $100,000 through investing electric companies. The remaining $100,000 can be split between the four members of our company. This means we are each responsible for funding $25,000.

2001年11月18日 13時50分32秒

・修士論文エグゼクティブ・サマリー

This report summarizes the history of wind power development in the United States, and illustrates several risks involved in the wind power business. The author believes that the year 2001 is a turning point for the U.S. wind power industry. For one reason, the Bush administration took over the government this January and he might change federal energy policies; e.g., the new government might try to loosen present strict environmental regulations for the power industry, and also FERC (the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) might regulate wholesale electricity prices in California. Another reason is the energy crisis in California. The fact that Californians are suffering severe electricity shortages, and cash-strapped utilities are incapable of purchasing wholesale power anymore is apparently due to critical flaws in the deregulated market model. In California, wind energy developers and operators are facing so many uncertainties in the collapsed deregulated market that they can not expect any favorable accomplishments in the future. However, the author found there is a new movement breaking out in electricity-tight California. California's problems with high electricity prices and the risk of electricity outages have led many to seek a new answer; i.e., small wind turbines may be great insurance against increases in electricity bills. Consequently, the author focused on this new market in the Bay Area where the demand for small or micro wind turbines for homeowners is rapidly increasing. This report thus investigates the feasibility of a new business associated with this small wind turbine market. It is just 20 years since large-scale wind farms were first exploited in California. California has developed three huge wind farms (Altamont Pass, Tehachapi Pass, and San Gorgonio Pass) and led the world in its capacity, owing to the sufficient government support such as tax credits. California's efforts to promote renewable energy sources were admirable; the state produced more than 90 percent of the world's wind power in the 1980s. However, the wind industry in California has been in deep depression since 1990, compared with European countries・ current significant achievements. Many politicians in Sacramento and Washington failed to push renewable's development and energy efficiency in the mid-1990s when energy prices were relatively low and public's attention was elsewhere (San Francisco Chronicle (Feb. 12, 2001)). One of the key setbacks for the renewable industry came in a 1995 FERC decision sought by Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas & Electric that resulted in the cancellation of millions of dollars in renewable contracts that were about to take effect. At that time, Kenetech Windpower Inc., the market leader of U.S. wind energy, declared bankruptcy due to its flawed management and equipment problems. In 1999, with the expiration of the federal Production Tax Credit (PTC), many large-scale wind farms were dramatically constructed in the central states such as Minnesota, Iowa, and Texas. Ironically, California now has the need for repowering wind energy; e.g., the roughly 5,400 windmills remaining in Altamont Pass produce only about half the power generated there in 1994. Long-anticipated plans to repower Altamont Pass with more modern machines are on hold again and again due to the strict environmental regulations in California. Even wind energy should execute its environmental impact assessment. Needless to say, these current trends have led wind energy developers to shift their business bases from California to the Great Plains region. Furthermore, the energy industry in California has become much more complicated. Since last December, the energy crisis has been hitting California. Severe supply shortages and soaring natural gas prices have made wholesale electricity prices much higher, and this has led the state・s utility companies, which have provided a regulated rate of electricity to customers, to be on the brink of bankruptcy. As a result, utilities haven't been able to pay wind farm operators sufficiently for the power generated since November. Amazingly, utilities saw the price of wind energy nearly triple in one month ・ from 6 cents per kilowatt-hour in November to 16 cents in December, said PG&E spokesman John Tremayne in the Oakland Tribune (February 26, 2001). That means wind power operators are facing severe risks; they aren・t paid enough by utilities for their electricity. Accordingly, wind energy developers regard California as a less attractive market, and they are forced to search for other markets outside the state. However, since this January, a new market is emerging in California that no one has anticipated. Bergey Windpower Co., Inc., one of the major U.S. turbine manufactures, stated that it sold 40 small home turbines in California this January, compared with just six in all of 2000 and 12 in all of 1999. This means a new age of affordable personal power generation system is coming to California. San Francisco Chronicle also picked up this topic in February 27, "As power prices rise, windmills are one way to decrease costs." Although we can not accurately forecast the potential demand for small or micro turbines in urban areas, people are sure to be more careful of electricity conservation due to expected rate hikes in the coming year. From these points of view, this report describes risk assessment and management indispensable for the wind energy business under competitive electricity markets, and investigates the impacts of the energy crisis in California. And finally, the author implements a feasibility study of wind resource database business for homeowners in California.

2001年11月15日 22時33分54秒

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